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Available online xxxxAlong with political and economic changes, the fall of the socialist regimes in Central and Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union brought about fundamental institutional reforms. Several
studies have examined the causes of the increasing unhappiness that accompanied the transition
process, including deteriorating public goods, rising inequality, income volatility, stagnating labor
market conditions and changing norms. However, few papers have sought explanations for the
life satisfaction differentials between transition and non-transition economies. In this paper, I spe-
ciﬁcally examine the life satisfaction gap between post-socialist and advanced countries and the
role of political institutions for explaining this gap. My results imply that both macro-economic
factors and the rule of law explain the overall life satisfaction differential between the advanced
and transition societies. The rule of law played an additional role in reducing the happiness gap
in the 1990s and may have even reversed it in the post-crisis years. As institutions and macro-
economic conditions continue to improve, post-socialist countries may complete their transfor-
mation processes and achieve quality-of-life levels comparable with those in the West.
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Beginningwith the emblematic fall of the BerlinWall in 1989, the transition process in the former Soviet Union (FSU) and Central and
Eastern Europe (CEE) was a period of far-reaching socio-economic, political and institutional changes. The reforms included switching
from a planned to a market economy, restoring private property as well as liberalizing prices and foreign exchange (EC, 2015a). Impor-
tantly, these ﬂedgling democracies had to create the legal and institutional fundamentals that underpin democratic and capitalists states,
including designing modern institutions of public ﬁnance, (central) banking and customs (Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 2009).
One of the lessons learned from these experiences is that while the design and introduction of institutions can happen relatively
quickly, achieving a functioning institutional framework to support a modern democracy is a long-term process (EC, 2015b). Moreover,
the build-up of new political and economic institutions in the transition region coincided with a decline in the quality of formal and in-
formal institutions such as falling social trust and increasing corruption, weakened civil societies and an overall decline in social capital
(see Bartolini et al., 2015 for a review).1
Several studies document a trend of unhappiness that accompanied the transition process and suggest that a persistent life
satisfaction differential still exists between transition and non-transition countries. This paper examines the role of rule of lawd norms of reciprocity and trust” that enable communities to solve collective action problems (Adsera et al.,
economies and the EU depends on the quality of formal political institutions and the level of development
ion process (Fidrmuc and Gërxhani, 2008).
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ﬁnds that in addition to macro-economic factors, the conditional unhappiness gap may be accounted for by political institutions
proxied by the RoL. This suggests that as institutional and market reforms continue, citizens in post-socialist economies may
achieve the same quality of life as their counterparts in developed market economies.
Subjective well-being (SWB) metrics track positive and negative emotions, life evaluations and life purpose and have
individual-, economic- and institutional-level determinants. Life satisfaction in particular is a perceived quality-of-life measure
and is a cognitive reﬂective assessment of one's life as a whole. Because they trace both material and non-material aspects of
life, SWB metrics furnish important complementary information to objective indicators such as income, employment and con-
sumption. Furthermore, they are especially well-suited for studying the well-being implications of complex processes such as in-
stitutional reform or transition to democracy and a market economy. Given that it reﬂects both perceived and actual quality of life
and as such is a broad welfare indicator, SWB has emerged as a key variable for economic and policy analysis. For example, SWB
is linked with objective outcomes such as productivity, creativity, longevity and creativity (De Neve et al., 2013). Importantly,
SWB may be relevant for the political process as voting behavior may be partly determined by SWB (Dolan et al., 2008;
Liberini et al., 2014; Ward, 2015). Thus, studying how institutions and macro-economic conditions affect SWB and whether
they can help transition countries on their way to prosperity is important for policy-makers at national and supra-national levels.
While the large life satisfaction gap between transition economies and other nations at similar or different levels of develop-
ment is well documented, few papers have explored its determinants. (Djankov et al., 2016; Gruen and Klasen, 2012; Guriev and
Zhuravskaya, 2009).3 This paper builds on and substantially extends previous studies in several ways. First, unlike other studies
exploring the differences between transition and non-transition countries, this study explicitly examines the life satisfaction gap
between transition and advanced countries. If the transition process entails reaching the level of development and material and
non-material standards of developed countries, then I argue that advanced countries, and not non-transition countries in general,
are the relevant comparison group.4 Second, I look at the life satisfaction differentials in light of a previously understudied factor,
namely the RoL. Since institutions can both improve the quality of the social fabric and enhance economic outcomes, I examine
both the direct and indirect inﬂuences of institutions on the size of the SWB gap by controlling for a number of macro-
economic variables. Third, I use variance decompositions to study the relative importance of macro-economic vs. institutional
and socio-demographic factors for individual life satisfaction in transition, which to my knowledge has not been undertaken in
this context before. Finally, I distinguish between EU and non-EU transition countries and observe whether EU membership
and the institutional transformations entailed had a particular effect for post-socialist countries.2. Life and unhappiness in transition
Fig. 1 shows the average life satisfaction levels for transition and advanced countries in the main analysis sample based on data
from the last four waves of the World Value Survey (1994–2013). Using earlier WVS waves, other studies document that life sat-
isfaction has a V-shape in transition economies (Easterlin, 2009, 2014; Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 2009; Sanfey and Teksoz, 2007).
During the 1990s, life satisfaction dramatically fell in transition economies, mirroring GDP trends, and while it eventually began to
recover in the late-1990s, it failed to do so commensurately with GDP (Easterlin, 2009). Using data from later years, I show that
while there was a large life satisfaction gap between advanced and transition economies in the mid-1990s, this gap has recently
started to close. Nonetheless, even in the last WVS wave, the unconditional happiness gap is about 1 on a scale of 1–10, which is
substantial. According to Fig. 1, while life evaluations in advanced economies have remained relatively stable over the analysis
period, those in transition countries started at relatively low levels in mid-1990s. Accordingly, this paper focuses on studying
what underlies the life satisfaction differentials between transition and advanced nations.
The conclusion of the relatively large literature on unhappiness in transition is that people in post-socialist economies paid for these
tectonic transformations with their SWB. While income is certainly part of the explanation of unhappiness in transition, it does not ac-
count for the entire puzzle (Bartolini et al., 2015). Other causes of declining happiness in transition economies could include the depre-
ciation of education acquired under socialism, deteriorating public goods, income inequality (Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 2009), worsening
social protection and stagnating employment conditions (Easterlin, 2009), as well as changing norms and volatility (Graham and
Pettinato, 2002). Moreover, large-scale reforms such as privatizationmay have further lowered happiness in transition (Popova, 2014).5
Transition economies present an opportune case to study the well-being consequences of institutions for several reasons. First, these
nationswitnessed the formation of new institutions or the fundamental restructuring of old ones. Importantly, this experience has varied
across the transition region, with some countries making substantial progress while others lagging behind (Askarov and Doucouliagos,2 The “happiness gap” in this paper is borrowed from Guriev and Zhuravskaya (2009). Note, however, that Guriev and Zhuravskaya (2009) examine the differences be-
tween transition and non-transition countries (including advanced and developing countries), while I study the gap between transition and advanced Western nations.
3 Note thatDjankov et al. (2016)work,which appeared after this paperwas already in the editorial andpublication process, focuses onEastern Europe and uses cross-
country panel regressions to argue that the happiness gap is explained by perceptions of government and corruption proxies.
4 I use the list of advanced economies from the International Monetary Fund Appendix Table B (IMF, 2015), which includes: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada,
Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia are considered advanced in the IMF's list, although we include them in the transition countries list.
5 Factors such as increasing economic, political and social freedoms (Inglehart et al., 2008; Lelkes, 2006; Sanfey and Teksoz, 2007) and greater access to consumer goods
(Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 2009) were arguably a positive channel affecting life satisfaction in transition. However, it seems that the negative experiences during transition
associated with rapid political and economic change and fundamental socio-economic, social and institutional transformations dominated the transition experience.
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Fig. 1. Life satisfaction, unconditional mean, 1994–2013.
Source: Author's calculations based on the World Value Survey, merged with the World Bank's macro data and the PRS' ICRG data.
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levels and trends (Bartolini et al., 2015). For example, post-socialist societies are among the least happy countries in theworld, evenwhen
controlling for income.Moreover,while themuch-disputed Easterlin Paradox—or the observation that rises in incomedonot lead to SWB
increases in long time-series data—may not hold overall (Stevenson andWolfers, 2008), transition countries are an exception. Speciﬁcal-
ly, in these societies, economic growth predicts both short- and long-run changes in SWB (Easterlin, 2009). Third, while institutional
change is generally only incremental, several transition countries altered their institutional arrangements in light of preparations for
EU accession. Thus, given the large unconditional SWB gap between transition and advanced countries, it is important for policy-
makers to understand the role of the RoL (if any) in closing this gap and achieving higher quality of life for transitional citizens.
3. Rule of law in transition
North (1991) deﬁnes institutions as informal and formal rules and constraints that guide and enable political, economic and social
interactions and reduce uncertainty in exchange. Institutional quality is instrumentally important for economic performance (North,
1990), growth (Acemoglu et al., 2005; Dawson, 1998; Easterly et al., 2006) and health outcomes (Kozlov and Balalaeva, 2014).
There is much heterogeneity with respect to the level of economic and institutional advancements among post-socialist econ-
omies. Membership prospects to NATO, the OECD and the EU served as external anchors shaping the institutional changes in
these countries by encouraging reforms that comply with the principles of democracy, respect for minorities, human rights and
civil liberties, as well as functioning market economies. In light of this, two different patterns of democratic and economic trans-
formation have emerged based on geographic proximity to the EU (Golinelli and Rovelli, 2013): speciﬁcally, despite frustrating
market reforms, countries closer to the EU have had more stable democracies, while those belonging to the Commonwealth of
Independent States are still struggling to reform certain features of the political process (Golinelli and Rovelli, 2013).
TheRoL refers to a systemwithwell-deﬁned, universally applicable and fair laws. The extent towhichRoL exists in a country is judged
by the presence or absence of objective criteria, which can vary but usually include an independent and impartial judiciary, public laws,
universal application of the law and no retroactive laws, among others (WorldBank, 2013). The RoL also requires that the government
functions within the legal framework and public ofﬁcials accept and follow the law (Carothers, 1998). Importantly, the RoL is intimately
linkedwith the concept of democracy, ensuring the respect of people's civil and human rights, aswell aswith a functioningmarket econ-
omy, as it allows for contract enforcement and respect of property rights, the functioning of economic institutions such as banks, labor
unions, and corporations and economic policy related to taxation, customs, regulation and others (Carothers, 1998).
Theoretically, the RoL in transition economies can change over time based on the depth of the RoL reforms. Speciﬁcally, Carothers
(1998) distinguishes among three types or reforms. Type I refers to revising laws and codes and redrafting laws in the economic
realm such as bankruptcy law, corporate governance, taxation and ﬁnance. By contrast, Type II reforms target law-related institutions
by tightening ethic codes, increasing salaries for court employees, reforms targeting the police, prosecutors, prisons and public defenders,
among others. Finally, Type III reforms seek government compliance with the law, for example, by achieving judicial independence. The
RoL in transition economies is expected to change as these reforms are undertaken and as the social norms and practices change toPlease cite this article as: Nikolova, M., Minding the happiness gap: Political institutions and perceived quality of life in transition,
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ple of transition countries, while the RoL levels have remained relatively stable for the advanced countries.
The end of the Cold War revived the RoL debate, with development experts around the world pointing to the RoL as an om-
nipotent solution for overcoming the institutional challenges in transition economies (Carothers, 1998). As the most active region
for RoL reform, transition economies attracted various types of assistance. While this assistance has contributed to democracy, it
has had no or even a negative effect on the quality of governance (Askarov and Doucouliagos, 2015).
This study focuses on the RoL as a key explanatory variable for the life satisfaction differentials between transition and ad-
vanced economies while also controlling for economic conditions in the two sets of countries. While I account for economic dif-
ferentials, I argue that political institutions, and the RoL in particular, are the relevant explanatory factors for the life satisfaction
gap for several reasons. First, several studies show that political institutions and their consequences are more important in
middle- and high-income economies than in low-income economies (Bjørnskov et al., 2010; Dorn et al., 2007; Helliwell and
Huang, 2008; Rode, 2013). As Rode (2013) notes, economic conditions and material well-being precede RoL reforms to allow cit-
izens to derive procedural utility from institutions. In most transition economies, economic conditions had recovered by the mid-
1990s, the beginning of the analysis period used in this paper, thus allowing me to discern the additional effects, if any, of political
institutions and the RoL in explaining the life satisfaction gap.
Second, because the RoL concept is related to democracy and themarket economy, it theoretically holds particular relevance for tran-
sition economies striving to complete their democratization andmarketizationprocesses. Third, RoL reformshavebeen themost active in
the transition region (Carothers, 1998). Fourth, fromapractical viewpoint, the RoL is the strongest index of political institutions because it
measures the extent to which there is contract enforcement, property rights and the absence of crime and violence. By contrast, other
existing measures of political institutions such as good governance, control of corruption, government stability and others are conse-
quences of good institutions and not institutions per se (Adsera et al., 2003; Nikolova, 2015). Concepts such as democracy, good gover-
nance and economic freedom are arguably also more subjective and less precisely measured than the RoL. Many of the extant indices of
good governance and quality of institutions are also correlated with one another and broadly reﬂect one key concept related to the con-
sequences of good institutions (Bjørnskov et al., 2010; Langbein and Knack, 2010).4. Subjective well-being and institutions
The main outcome of interest is life satisfaction, which is a cognitive assessment of one's contentment with life as a whole.
Scholars distinguish between evaluative and hedonic well-being, and, in some instances, eudaimonic constructs related to feelings
of meaning and purpose in life (Graham and Nikolova, 2015; OECD, 2013; Stone and Mackie, 2014). Evaluative well-being relates
to the opportunities and means that people have, while hedonic well-being encompasses positive and negative feelings and
covers how people experience their daily lives (Graham and Nikolova, 2015). Despite earlier skepticism about subjective data
(Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001), several decades of research have shown that SWB metrics are valid, reliable and comparableFig. 2. Rule of law, unconditional mean, 1994–2013.
Source: Author's calculations based on the PRS' ICRG data merged with the World Value Survey and the World Bank's macro data.
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2010; Helliwell et al., 2010; Kahneman and Krueger, 2006; OECD, 2011, 2013; Stone and Mackie, 2014).
Importantly, while some of the inﬂuences behind cross-country SWB differentials are well documented, much of the SWB dif-
ferences among countries may be unknown or, as Proto and Oswald (2016) suggest, possibly genetically determined, at least in
part. As such, individual-, macro- and institutional-level variables cannot completely explain all of the variation in SWB. In this
paper, I consider the cross-country differences between the SWB levels of individuals living in transition and advanced countries
conditional on a large set of determinants. Nonetheless, the reported R2 values are relatively low, reﬂecting the notion that much
of well-being is unexplained and unobservable.
The increased attention of SWB measures among policy-makers, academics, and the general public alike is partly due to the
growing realization that GDP and employment statistics are insufﬁcient to understand all aspects of human well-being (Stiglitz
et al., 2009). While economists prefer studying revealed choices rather than subjective self-assessments, SWB metrics are partic-
ularly valuable when studying public goods preferences (Welsch, 2002, 2006, 2007, 2008) and welfare tradeoffs, such as those
between inﬂation and unemployment, for example (DiTella et al., 2001).
SWB metrics also furnish a complementary perspective about the welfare implications of complex social or political processes
such as economic and political transitions (Easterlin, 2014). While traditional macro-economic indicators are important, they can-
not fully capture the implications of the profound changes that occurred during transition, such as rising inequality, unemploy-
ment and crime, the loss of social protection, rising alcoholism, suicide and divorce rates, among many others (Easterlin, 2009).
The happiness economics approach is also useful for assessing the well-being consequences of situations whereby individuals
are themselves powerless to change, such as institutional arrangements and social norms (Graham, 2011).
There are several reasons why institutions can affect individual quality-of-life perceptions. First, people may enjoy participating
in the democratic process (Frey and Stutzer, 2000) and exposure to democracy may raise individual well-being as democracies
are more likely to reﬂect preferences (Dorn et al., 2007). “Procedural utility” thus refers to the satisfaction gained from the pro-
cedural aspects of institutions, i.e. from “institutions as such” (Frey et al., 2004). In short, individuals may value not only the out-
comes of the political process but also how these outcomes were achieved.
Second, by reducing uncertainty and transaction costs, good institutions and the RoL in particular can promote well-being by:
(i) preventing theft, violence and economic exploitation; (ii) enforcing property rights; and (iii) providing the means to inﬂuence
the political process (Bjørnskov et al., 2010). Third, solid formal and informal institutions improve the quality of the social fabric,
as another direct channel to life satisfaction (Delhey, 2001). Similarly, good institutions imply a strong social contract guided by
norms of civic engagement, which is also conducive to greater well-being. Virtuous cycles may form, whereby happiness stimu-
lates social capital formation that is conducive to economic development, which in turn improves formal institutions and ulti-
mately happiness.6 Fourth, bad institutions, such as those marked by corruption and inefﬁciency, may have high psychological
costs stemming from living in a dysfunctional society (Welsch, 2008). Finally, institutions can also indirectly affect SWB through
income if it affects economic indicators and government services.
A relatively extensive academic literature investigates the empirical and theoretical links between SWB on the one hand and political
and economic institutions and economic freedom on the other. First, one strand of the literature focuses on economic freedom, captured
by the Economic Freedom Index (EFI) from the Fraser Institute (Gehring, 2013; Graaﬂand and Compen, 2012; Nikolaev, 2014; Rode,
2013; Spruk and Kešeljević, 2015).7 Given that it emphasizes the importance of markets and the organization of economic activity, eco-
nomic freedom is fundamentally distinguishable from political freedom, which refers to democracy and political rights (Gehring, 2013).
Whilemost studies automatically assume that causality runs fromgood institutions and economic freedom to SWB, Rode's (2013) instru-
mental variable analysis demonstrates that while economic freedom inﬂuences life satisfaction, the reverse is also true. The author sug-
gests that more life-satisﬁed people also have higher social capital, which in turn creates better institutions.
Like Rode (2013) and Gehring (2013), who ﬁnd a link between EFI and its components and life satisfaction at the country
level, Nikolaev (2014) shows that economic freedom is positively and signiﬁcantly associated with individual life satisfaction, hap-
piness and ﬁnancial satisfaction, among other outcomes. His results also imply that in high-income countries, the positive inﬂu-
ence of economic freedom on SWB is entirely driven by income (i.e. the association between economic freedom and life
satisfaction disappears once the income control is introduced).
Using theWorldValue Survey and theWorldwideGovernance Indicators, Helliwell andHuang (2008) deﬁne democratic quality as the
average of voice, accountability and political stability scores and delivery quality as the average of government effectiveness, regulatory
quality, RoL and control of corruption. The authors discover that while democratic quality matters in rich nations, the emphasis is on de-
livery aspects in poor countries. Likewise, Bjørnskov et al. (2010) show that economic-judicial institutions matter in low-income coun-
tries, while political institutions are more relevant in mid- and high-income countries. In a similar vein, Dorn et al. (2007) ﬁnd that the
positive effect of democracy on happiness is stronger in established democracies. With respect to the sub-components of the EIF, Rode
(2013) ﬁnds that respondents in developing countries value the procedural features of democracy, access to secure money and free
trade, while their rich country counterparts value the functioning of the legal system and the protection of property rights. Likewise,
Gehring (2013) discovers that poorer countries beneﬁt more from economic freedom compared with more advanced countries. Impor-
tantly, the results (in terms of both signiﬁcance and the direction of the association between SWB and institutions) seem to depend on6 Nonetheless, the empirical evidence seems to suggest that the causal channel runs from good institutions to life satisfaction, while the reverse channel is relatively
weaker (Rode, 2013).
7 The Economic Freedom Index comprises ﬁve areas: government size; legal structure and property rights security; money; freedom to trade internationally; and
regulation of credit, labor and business (Nikolaev, 2014).
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Scholars have also studied the link between life satisfaction and informal institutions such as religiosity, social trust and mem-
bership in voluntary and civic organizations. Using Eurobarometer data for 2001, Hudson (2006) is the ﬁrst to show that trust in
the national government and several supra-national institutions is positively associated with life satisfaction in the EU member
states. Speciﬁcally for transition economies, Bartolini et al. (2015) ﬁnd that social trust is a powerful determinant of observed
SWB trends in the long run, being even more powerful than GDP. However, in the short run, only GDP matters for SWB in tran-
sition economies. Of course, causality can go in both directions as happier people may also be more trusting. A study using Hun-
garian data for the 1990s shows that regularly attending religious services is positively associated with life satisfaction (Lelkes,
2006). Moreover, the transition process less adversely affected those who were attached to religious institutions. Similarly,
Popova (2014) ﬁnds that religion acts as social insurance in transition, protecting against painful reforms such as large-scale pri-
vatization. In addition, recent research by Helliwell et al. (2014) shows that social trust explains country-level life satisfaction
changes in Europe's post-socialist countries but not in the advanced countries, thus suggesting the importance of informal insti-
tutions for countries experiencing institutional changes.
While few studies explicitly examine the link between institutions and life satisfaction in transition economies, several ﬁndings shed
some light. Using data from the Freedom House on civil rights and political liberties, Gruen and Klasen (2012) suggest that there have
been improvements in the civil rights and liberties in the EU transition countries and that lower civil liberties are negatively linked
with overall life satisfaction. Sanfey and Teksoz (2007) use data from the 4thWVSwave and theWGI indicators and conclude that if tran-
sition economies were to increase the average quality of institutions to that of the EU-15, theywould experience a 1.36-point increase in
life satisfaction (on a 1–10 scale). Nikolaev (2014) shows that the Economic Freedom Index is negatively associatedwith life satisfaction
in post-socialist societies. The author explains this ﬁndingwith Friedman's admonition that economic freedomalone is insufﬁcient to en-
sure progress; rather, the RoL is necessary to support progress. Furthermore, Popova (2014) discovers that life satisfaction in transition is
unassociatedwith change in the EBRD's governance reform and enterprise restructuring indicator. Using data from the European Values
Survey for the EU-10,8 one studyﬁnds that the life satisfaction effect of a one-point improvement in theWorld Bank's corruptionmeasure
equated to a 10% convergence towards the average EU-27 GDP in 2008 (Rodriguez-Pose and Maslauskaite, 2012).
5. Data and variables
The main data source is the Integrated Values Surveys 1981–2014, constructed from the EVS Longitudinal Data File 1981–2008
and the World Value Survey 1981–2014.9 I merge macro-economic data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators
(WDI) and institutional data from the PRS International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).10 The World Value Survey ﬁrst included tran-
sition economies in Wave 2, conducted between 1989 and 1992 (Hungary was also surveyed in the ﬁrst wave). However, once I
merge the datasets and eliminate observations with missing data, the analysis sample spans 1994–2013.
Despite being widely used, WVS has several limitations.11 First, the data are pooled-cross sections rather than a panel, thus not
allowing for the use of individual ﬁxed effects. Constructing a country-level panel was unfeasible because different countries are polled
in different waves, which would have resulted in an unbalanced panel with a small number of observations. Second, while the EVS has
information on income, the WVS data do not have an income variable (with actual dollar amounts) but rather report respondents' val-
uation of their household incomeon a notional scalewhere 1 corresponds to the lowest level in society and 10 corresponds to the highest
(See Table A.1 in the Appendix A). Note that country-level income and economic development differences are taken into account by in-
cluding the PPP-adjusted per capita income variable from the World Bank's WDI.
The dependent variable is life satisfaction, measured on a scale of 1–10 (Table A.1). In addition, following the extant literature,
this study adds three individual-level proxies for social capital and cohesion from the WVS. I include (i) the number of member-
ships in voluntary and civic groups; (ii) a binary indicator for whether most people in society can be trusted; and (iii) an indicator
for the importance of religion in the respondent's life. These social capital variables inﬂuence the quality of formal institutions and
are also linked with life satisfaction.12 Furthermore, religiosity (i.e. the importance of religion) reﬂects values and attitudes that
affect behavior such as marriage, fertility and decorous conduct, all of which are linked with life satisfaction. Using a short panel for
the US, Lim and Putnam (2010) demonstrate that religiosity affects life satisfaction by building social networks through attending reli-
gious services. Note that this study considers religiosity rather than belonging to a particular faith. The former can be thought of as an
informal institution through the social externalities dimensions of religion. The ﬁnal informal capital measure is the average member-
ships in voluntary and civic groups, which also reﬂects social capital through networks (Bjørnskov et al., 2010).
I use the Law and Order variable from the ICRG CountryData from the PRS group, which ranges from 0 to 6 (Table A.2 in the
Appendix A).13 Since 1980, the ICRG has rated 144 countries on 22 variables classiﬁed in three categories of risk, namely political,8 The EU-10 refers to the ten transition economies that became EU members in 2004 and 2007.
9 While other sources such as the European Social Survey (ESS), Eurobarometer and the New Democracy Barometer are possible, they have limited country and/or year
coverage.
10 As a robustness check, in the appendix I use an alternative data source for the RoL, namely the WGI.
11 For the remainder of this paper, WVS refers to the integrated EVS/WVS data ﬁle.
12 For example, Fidrmuc and Gërxhani (2008) document a social capital gap (measured as civic participation and access to social networks) between transition econ-
omies and the West. Once the authors account for economic development and quality of institutions, the gap no longer exists.
13 This re-scalingwas undertaken to be consistent with the re-scaling of theWGI's rule of law variable, which is used as a robustness check. The results are available in the
appendix.
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institutional quality) and low values reﬂect high risk. The maximum value depends on the component's overall weight in the po-
litical risk index. ICRG editors assign risk points based on a series of pre-set questions to ensure comparability across countries
and over time. The law and order variable comprises two sub-variables: the law component is about the fairness of the legal sys-
tem, while order is about the poplar observance of a law. A country could score high on the “law” component if it has an unbiased
judicial system but low on the “order” component if it is plagued by crime or illegal activity (PRS, 2014). Because PRS reports the
RoL indicator on a monthly basis, I calculated simple annual averages for each country.
As a robustness check, I use the RoL variable from the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (See Appendix).
The WGIs reﬂect the perceptions of international organizations, NGOs, experts, businesses and households on a range of gover-
nance aspects (Kaufmann et al., 2010). For ease of interpretation and consistency with the ICRG variable, I rescaled the RoL var-
iable from its original range of −2.5 to +2.5 to a new range from 0 to 6, where a higher score indicates better institutional
quality. Tables A.1 and A.2 show the included variables and Table A.3 displays the list of included countries. The choice of coun-
tries in all analyses is determined by data availability.
6. Methodology




EuroLifeSaticw ¼ αþ βTransc þ X′icwγþ ςr þωw þ εicw; ð1Þwhere LifeSat is the life satisfaction of individual i in country c polled in survey wave w (and measured on a scale of 1–10). Trans is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is a transition economy and 0 if it is an advanced economy. The parameter of interest is β,
which shows the conditional difference between transition and non-transition countries controlling for the individual-level controls.
Xic is a matrix of personal characteristics (such as age, gender, education, household composition, income scale and others), ς are region
dummies andω are survey wave dummies, while εic is a vector of stochastic errors. Note that Eq. (1) uses only individual-level controls.
To assess the extent to which macro-economic variables help to explain the observed life satisfaction differentials (i.e. reduce
the size and/or the signiﬁcance of β), I add a vector of country-level macro-economic controls M (GDP per capita, inﬂation, and
unemployment) and estimate the following model:LifeSaticw ¼ αþ βTransc þ X′icwγþM′cwψþ ςr þωw þ εicw ð2ÞThe additional role of the RoL variable in explaining life satisfaction is estimated in:LifeSaticw ¼ αþ βTransc þ X′icwγþ δRoLcw þM′cwψþ ςr þωw þ εicw ð3ÞThe identiﬁcation in Eqs. (2) and (3) relies on variation in country-level macro-economic and institutional differentials, conditioning
on a large set of individual controls, which precludes the possibility of using country dummies. All analyses include survey wave and re-
gional dummies. While it is possible to include country dummies in Eq. (1), for consistency purposes, the model includes regional
dummies instead. The regions included are the Balkans, the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Ukraine, non-European ad-
vanced countries (the US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Korea, Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong), South-Central Europe and Northern
Europe.14
As has been standard practice in the literature, I use an OLS estimator with robust standard errors because ignoring the
ordinality of the life satisfaction data does not seem to matter for the ﬁnal results (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004). More-
over, OLS estimates can also be easily interpreted in terms of marginal effects. As there is a technical problem in including vari-
ables at a higher level of aggregation (Moulton, 1990), I cluster the standard errors at the country level.
In addition, I examine the relative importance of institutions vis-à-vis other variables for life satisfaction in the transition econ-
omies sample. For this purpose, I employ Shapley-based decompositions (Israeli, 2007; Shorrocks, 2013), which decompose the R2
statistic into the individual percentage contribution of each independent variable to the total variance of life satisfaction.15
Frequently used in the inequality literature, regression-based decomposition is a particularly useful technique for economists who
wish to explain the relative importance of a variable for the overall R2. Speciﬁcally, while standardized coefﬁcient estimates andmarginal
effects reveal the relative inﬂuence of a variable in the statistical sense, variance decompositions can show the additional value added, and
therefore the relative inﬂuence, of a variable as an explanatory factor (Menard, 2004). Themethod essentially relies on decomposing the
goodness of ﬁt statistic into the sum of variances explained by each independent variable (Israeli, 2007). There are two types of variance
decompositions, namely the Fieldsmethod (Fields, 2003, 2004) and the Shapleymethod (Israeli, 2007). In this paper, I use the latter tech-
nique as it is slightly more ﬂexible and allows for correlations among the independent variables.
Endogeneity stemming from reverse causality is less of a problem in this empirical setup, because individual citizens are generally un-
able to change institutional arrangements. Nonetheless, reverse causality would be possible if politicians take into account informationthe sample using the RoL data from the WGI, both Ukraine and Georgia are included in the CIS group.
erform the variance decompositions, I used Stata's user-written package -shapley2- (Juarez, 2012).
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Table 1
Life satisfaction regressions, socio-economic and macro-economic determinants, 1994–2013.
Source: Author's calculations based on the PRS' ICRG data merged with the World Value Survey and the World Bank's macro data.
Dep. var. = life satisfaction (1−10) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Transition country (1 = yes) −0.893⁎⁎⁎ −0.302
(0.269) (0.252)
Transition ∗ Wave 3 (1994–98) −1.841⁎⁎⁎ −1.287⁎⁎⁎
(0.256) (0.289)
Transition ∗ Wave 4 (1999–04) −1.293⁎⁎⁎ −0.686⁎
(0.354) (0.400)
Transition ∗ Wave 5 (2005–09) −0.680⁎⁎ −0.337
(0.257) (0.266)
Transition ∗ Wave 6 (2010−13) −0.098 0.135
(0.254) (0.224)
Religion important (1 = yes) 0.237⁎⁎⁎ 0.211⁎⁎⁎ 0.239⁎⁎⁎ 0.220⁎⁎⁎
(0.059) (0.051) (0.060) (0.054)
Social trust (1 = yes) 0.390⁎⁎⁎ 0.389⁎⁎⁎ 0.344⁎⁎⁎ 0.355⁎⁎⁎
(0.046) (0.041) (0.038) (0.036)
Number of memberships 0.033 0.041⁎⁎ 0.053⁎⁎⁎ 0.056⁎⁎⁎
(0.029) (0.018) (0.015) (0.011)
Age −0.088⁎⁎⁎ −0.086⁎⁎⁎ −0.089⁎⁎⁎ −0.088⁎⁎⁎
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Age2 0.001⁎⁎⁎ 0.001⁎⁎⁎ 0.001⁎⁎⁎ 0.001⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male −0.090⁎⁎⁎ −0.086⁎⁎⁎ −0.073⁎⁎ −0.076⁎⁎⁎
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027)
Married or living together (1 = yes) 0.391⁎⁎⁎ 0.415⁎⁎⁎ 0.414⁎⁎⁎ 0.419⁎⁎⁎
(0.040) (0.038) (0.035) (0.035)
Some college/college diploma (1 = yes) 0.108⁎⁎ 0.106⁎⁎ 0.110⁎⁎ 0.106⁎⁎⁎
(0.049) (0.041) (0.043) (0.039)
Number of children 0.030⁎ 0.024 0.035⁎⁎ 0.029⁎
(0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Full-time employee (1 = yes) 0.089⁎ 0.085⁎ 0.035 0.048
(0.046) (0.044) (0.037) (0.037)
Good health (1 = yes) 1.497⁎⁎⁎ 1.470⁎⁎⁎ 1.465⁎⁎⁎ 1.457⁎⁎⁎
(0.068) (0.073) (0.069) (0.070)
Relative income 0.182⁎⁎⁎ 0.171⁎⁎⁎ 0.168⁎⁎⁎ 0.164⁎⁎⁎
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
Log GDP per capita (2011 PPP) 0.788⁎⁎⁎ 0.433⁎⁎
(0.183) (0.174)




Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 90,181 90,181 88,274 88,274
Adjusted R2 0.274 0.295 0.290 0.301
Notes: The dependent variable is life satisfaction, measured on a scale of 1 to 10. All regressions are estimated using OLS with robust standard errors, clustered at
the country level. All regressions include wave dummies and region dummies. The included regions are the Balkans, the Commonwealth of Independent States and
the Ukraine, non-European advanced countries (the US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Korea, Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong), South-Central Europe and Northern
Europe. See Tables A.1–A.2 for variable deﬁnitions and Table A.3 for the included countries.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1
8 M. Nikolova / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxabout citizens' life satisfaction when designing and reforming institutions. Readers should treat the causal interpretation of the results
with caution given that endogeneity is possible if there are (time variant immeasurable) omitted variables correlated with both the
RoL and life satisfaction. Endogeneity can also stem frommeasurement error if the RoL variables are imprecisely measured.7. Results
7.1. Main results
Table 1 shows the estimations of Eqs. (1) and (2). In each regression, the dependent variable is individual life satisfaction measured
on a scale of 1–10. Models (1) and (2) use individual-level controls, while Models (3) and (4) include macro-economic controls. All
models include survey wave indicators and region dummies. The ﬁrst result (Model (1)) is that life satisfaction in transition economiesPlease cite this article as: Nikolova, M., Minding the happiness gap: Political institutions and perceived quality of life in transition,
European Journal of Political Economy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.07.008
Fig. 3. Conditional life satisfaction by wave, transition and advanced countries. Note: The ﬁgure represents the predictive margins of life satisfaction by survey wave
for transition and advanced countries (conditional marginal effects) with 95% conﬁdence intervals. The results are based on the estimations in Model (1) in Table 1.
Source: Author's calculations based on the PRS' ICRG data merged with the World Value Survey and the World Bank's macro data.
9M. Nikolova / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxis 0.9 points lower than its predicted level (as shown in the coefﬁcient on the dummy variable for whether the respondent comes from a
transition economy). This is the “life satisfaction gap” between transition and advanced economies.
Graphically, the life satisfaction gap is evident from Fig. 3, which plots the predicted life satisfaction values fromModel (1) in Table 1
for each survey wave using Stata's-margins-command and adjusting for the other variables included in the model. Fig. 3 demonstrates
the life satisfaction differential between post-socialist countries and the West throughout all survey waves. The life satisfaction gap of
0.9 is statistically signiﬁcant (evident from the non-overlapping conﬁdence intervals) and relatively large inmagnitude. The unstandard-
ized transition country dummy coefﬁcient inModel (1) Table 1 is more than two times larger than that of social trust (0.4), for example.
Following Guriev and Zhuravskaya (2009), Model (2) in Table 1 reports the regression results for all survey waves interacted
with the transition country dummy. These interactions estimate the average difference in life satisfaction between post-socialist
and advanced societies for each survey wave. Speciﬁcally, taking into consideration the non-linear effects over time, the life sat-
isfaction differential between transition and non-transition economies has been declining throughout the past decade, from 1.8
points in Wave 3 (1994–98) to 0.7 points in Wave 5 (2005–09). The conditional life satisfaction differential between transition
and advanced countries appears to have closed in the last survey wave as it is very small in magnitude (−0.1) and is statistically
insigniﬁcant. This is also graphically illustrated in Fig. 4, which shows that for the last survey wave (2010−2013) the conditional
life satisfaction differential between transition and advanced countries has closed.16
In Models (3) and (4) of Table 1, I add macro-economic controls from the World Bank's WDI database: log GDP per capita,
unemployment and the inﬂation rate. It is evident from the ﬁrst row in Model (3) that the difference between transition and
non-transition countries becomes statistically insigniﬁcant once I add macro-economic controls. In other words, including the
macro-economic controls eliminates the life satisfaction gap between post-socialist and advanced countries. Nonetheless, it is im-
portant to understand when exactly the life satisfaction gap closes.
Model (4) provides further information about the timing of the disappearance of the life satisfaction differentials. The interaction in
the second row(Transition ∗Wave3) shows that citizens in transition countrieswere 1.3 points less satisﬁedwith their lives compared to
their advanced countries counterparts in 1994–98, even after controlling for macro-economic differences. The gap becomes smaller in
magnitude (−0.7) and only marginally statistically signiﬁcant by 1999–2003 and is not statistically signiﬁcant thereafter. Therefore,
Models (3) and (4) jointly suggest thatwhilemacro-economic controls completely explain the average life satisfaction gapbetween tran-
sition and advanced countries in the 1994–2013 period, this relationship only begins starting in the mid-2000s. In Table 2, I further ex-
plore whether the RoL had any additional effects on reducing the gap in earlier years.
The coefﬁcient estimates for the other variables included in Table 1 alsowarrant attention. The coefﬁcient estimates for religiosity and
social trust are positive and statistically signiﬁcant, conforming to expectations and previous research ﬁndings. The number of member-
ships in voluntary and civil society groups becomes statistically signiﬁcant once I control for economic conditions, but is also signiﬁcant in16 Therefore, what other authors call a “persistent” life satisfaction gap only refers to the unconditional gap and ignoring non-linear time effects.
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Fig. 4. Life satisfaction by wave, transition and advanced countries. Note: The ﬁgure represents the predictive margins of life satisfaction by survey wave for tran-
sition and advanced countries (conditional marginal effects) with 95% conﬁdence intervals. The results are based on the estimations in Model (2) in Table 1, which
includes wave ∗ transition dummy interactions.
Source: Author's calculations based on the PRS' ICRG data merged with the World Value Survey and the World Bank's macro data.
10 M. Nikolova / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxModel (2). The rest of the socio-demographic variables generally have the expected signs. Life satisfaction is a U-shaped function of age
with theminimum occurring at about age 44 (based onModel (1)). Females are more satisﬁedwith their lives compared withmales. In
addition, beingmarried, having a college education andhaving good self-reportedhealth and income are all positively associatedwith life
satisfaction. Being a full-time employee and the number of children are either marginally signiﬁcant or not statistically signiﬁcant. Inﬂa-
tion is negatively associated with life satisfaction, while GDP per capita is positively associated with it, although the unemployment rate
coefﬁcient estimate is statistically insigniﬁcant.
In short, Table 1's main takeaway is that living in a post-socialist society is associated with substantially lower life satisfaction levels
comparedwith similar individuals living in theWest. The life satisfactionpenalty for living in a transition vs. an advanced country is about
0.9 on average, although it disappears in later surveywaves and once I account formacro-economic conditions. Using earlierWVSwaves
and a sample of transition and non-transition countries (including developing countries), Guriev and Zhuravskaya (2009) ﬁnd that even
after including GDP per capita and country-level controls the life satisfaction differential between transition and non-transition countries
is about 1.4 inwave 3 and 1.13 inwave 4 of theWVS. By contrast, according tomy results, the life satisfaction differential is 1.8 inWave 3
and is 1.3 in Wave 4, although it declines to 0.7 by Wave 5 and completely disappears by Wave 6 (2010–2013).
Table 2 includes the RoL variable from the PRS's ICRG data. Model (1) includes no macro-economic controls, Model (2) intro-
duces the macro-economic controls (in addition to the RoL), Model (3) includes interaction terms for the transition country
dummy and survey wave and Model (4) adds an interaction term between the RoL variable (minus its sample mean) and the
transition country dummy. The coefﬁcient on (the RoL-mean) ∗ transition interaction shows the life satisfaction gap between
transition and advanced countries evaluated at the mean of the RoL variable.
Model (1) shows that the life satisfaction differential reported in Table 1 (Models (1) and (2)) disappears once I control for the RoL.
Including themacro-economic controls inModel (2) does notmake a difference and the transition dummy remains statistically insignif-
icant. Interestingly, Model (3) shows that while citizens in transition countries are less satisﬁed in their lives in the 1994–1998wave, the
differential disappears between 1999 and 2009, whereas there is even a positive well-being premium for transition economies in the
post-crisis years in Wave 6 (2010–13). In other words, after controlling for macro-economic conditions and the RoL, respondents in
post-socialist economies appear to be happier than their counterparts in the West in the 2010–2013 period. While it remains an open
question whether this result persists in future waves, it could be due to the differential effects and timing of the crisis in Eastern
Europe (i.e. appearing later and having abated by 2010) (Åslund, 2010). This paper's results suggest that the RoL has had a mediating
effect during the economic crisis and its aftermath by fostering the life satisfaction of respondents in post-socialist economies.17
In all models, the RoL is positively associated with life satisfaction. However, the interaction between the RoL and the transi-
tion economies dummy in Model (4) shows that there is a life satisfaction penalty from the RoL for transition economies, al-
though the magnitude of this penalty (−0.33) is insufﬁcient to offset the positive life satisfaction inﬂuence of the RoL (0.56).17 Nonetheless, this result is not robust to using the different RoL data source in Table B.2.
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Table 2
Life satisfaction regressions, with rule of law control, 1994–2013.
Source: Author's calculations based on the PRS' ICRG data merged with the World Value Survey and the World Bank's macro data.
Dep. var. = life satisfaction (1–10) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Transition country (1 = yes) −0.144 0.227 0.169
(0.224) (0.199) (0.203)
Transition ∗ Wave 3 (1994–98) −0.441⁎⁎
(0.215)
Transition ∗ Wave 4 (1999–04) 0.034
(0.307)
Transition ∗ Wave 5 (2005–09) 0.043
(0.228)
Transition ∗ Wave 6 (2010–13) 0.612⁎⁎⁎
(0.209)
Rule of law (0–6) 0.406⁎⁎⁎ 0.402⁎⁎⁎ 0.383⁎⁎⁎ 0.562⁎⁎⁎
(0.129) (0.084) (0.071) (0.102)
(Rule of law -mean) ∗ Transition −0.324⁎⁎
(0.126)
Religion important (1 = yes) 0.218⁎⁎⁎ 0.214⁎⁎⁎ 0.201⁎⁎⁎ 0.221⁎⁎⁎
(0.041) (0.043) (0.040) (0.041)
Social trust (1 = yes) 0.343⁎⁎⁎ 0.319⁎⁎⁎ 0.333⁎⁎⁎ 0.314⁎⁎⁎
(0.045) (0.038) (0.035) (0.039)
Number of memberships 0.045⁎⁎⁎ 0.043⁎⁎⁎ 0.044⁎⁎⁎ 0.037⁎⁎⁎
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Age −0.083⁎⁎⁎ −0.083⁎⁎⁎ −0.083⁎⁎⁎ −0.083⁎⁎⁎
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Age2 0.001⁎⁎⁎ 0.001⁎⁎⁎ 0.001⁎⁎⁎ 0.001⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male −0.113⁎⁎⁎ −0.105⁎⁎⁎ −0.106⁎⁎⁎ −0.102⁎⁎⁎
(0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
Married or living together (1 = yes) 0.434⁎⁎⁎ 0.446⁎⁎⁎ 0.451⁎⁎⁎ 0.453⁎⁎⁎
(0.045) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038)
Some college/college diploma (1 = yes) 0.063 0.076⁎⁎ 0.072⁎⁎ 0.074⁎⁎
(0.038) (0.036) (0.034) (0.034)
Number of children 0.029⁎ 0.030⁎⁎ 0.026⁎ 0.025
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Full-time employee (1 = yes) 0.067⁎ 0.034 0.044 0.037
(0.037) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033)
Good Health (1 = yes) 1.530⁎⁎⁎ 1.498⁎⁎⁎ 1.489⁎⁎⁎ 1.495⁎⁎⁎
(0.069) (0.067) (0.069) (0.065)
Relative income 0.185⁎⁎⁎ 0.181⁎⁎⁎ 0.177⁎⁎⁎ 0.177⁎⁎⁎
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
Log GDP per capita (2011 PPP) 0.625⁎⁎⁎ 0.501⁎⁎⁎ 0.543⁎⁎⁎
(0.170) (0.144) (0.150)
Unemployment rate 0.010 0.005 0.003
(0.015) (0.015) (0.013)
Inﬂation −0.001⁎⁎⁎ −0.001⁎⁎⁎ −0.001⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 79,600 77,693 77,693 77,693
Adjusted R2 0.244 0.253 0.259 0.255
Notes: The dependent variable is life satisfaction, on a 1–10 scale. All regressions are estimated using OLS with robust standard errors, clustered at the country
level. All regressions include wave dummies and region dummies. The included regions are the Balkans, the Commonwealth of Independent States and the
Ukraine, non-European advanced countries (the US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Korea, Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong), South-Central Europe and Northern
Europe. See Tables A.1–A.2. for variable deﬁnitions and Table A.3 for the included countries.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
11M. Nikolova / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxThis implies that while the RoL allows for achieving positive social outcomes and contributes to life satisfaction in general, the
changes come at a life satisfaction cost, at least in a certain group of transition economies, as Table 3 reveals.7.2. Results by EU vs. non-EU status
As noted above, transition economies had to either fundamentally reform the extant institutions or create new ones from scratch. In
addition, many of the transition economies preparing for European Union (EU) membership had to shape their institutions in particularPlease cite this article as: Nikolova, M., Minding the happiness gap: Political institutions and perceived quality of life in transition,
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12 M. Nikolova / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxways to comply with EU admission criteria. Therefore, it is possible that while institutional reform is beneﬁcial for a society in the long
run, it also has short-term life satisfaction costs related to adapting to changes and new norms and rules.
To investigate the possible channels of institutional inﬂuence for life satisfaction stemming from EUmembership, in separate regres-
sions I compared: (i) EU-10 countries with the advanced countries, (ii) the non-EU-10 transition countries and the advanced countries
and (iii) the EU-10 and non-EU-10 transition countries (Table 3). Across the board, the RoL measure is positively associated with life
satisfaction.
Models (1) to (4) show that the transition country dummy is statistically insigniﬁcant, suggesting that there is no SWB pre-
mium or penalty for EU-10 countries compared with advanced countries (Models (1) and (2)) or when comparing the non-EU
transition countries with advanced countries ((Models (3) and (4)). In Model (2), the interaction between RoL and the transition
dummy is statistically insigniﬁcant, implying that there are no additional SWB beneﬁts stemming from the RoL for EU-10 coun-
tries relative to advanced countries. In Model (4), the interaction term is negative, suggesting that there is indeed a lifeTable 3
Life satisfaction regressions, with rule of law controls, EU and non-EU countries, 1994–2013.
Source: Author's calculations based on the PRS' ICRG data merged with the World Value Survey and the World Bank's macro data.
Dep. var. = life satisfaction
(1–10)













Transition country (1 = yes) 0.209 −0.120 0.421 0.209
(0.236) (0.305) (0.331) (0.347)
EU-10 country (1 = yes,
0 = non-EU transition)
−0.558⁎⁎ −0.117
(0.197) (0.257)
Rule of law (0–6) 0.459⁎⁎⁎ 0.527⁎⁎⁎ 0.368⁎⁎⁎ 0.502⁎⁎⁎ 0.308⁎⁎⁎ 0.211⁎⁎
(0.110) (0.104) (0.079) (0.095) (0.090) (0.097)
(Rule of law -mean) ∗ Transition −0.656 −0.298⁎⁎
(0.393) (0.137)
(Rule of law -mean) ∗ EU-10 0.655⁎⁎
(0.290)
Religion important (1 = yes) 0.225⁎⁎⁎ 0.230⁎⁎⁎ 0.187⁎⁎⁎ 0.188⁎⁎⁎ 0.287⁎⁎⁎ 0.268⁎⁎⁎
(0.044) (0.044) (0.046) (0.043) (0.058) (0.050)
Social trust (1 = yes) 0.326⁎⁎⁎ 0.327⁎⁎⁎ 0.333⁎⁎⁎ 0.329⁎⁎⁎ 0.285⁎⁎⁎ 0.288⁎⁎⁎
(0.050) (0.048) (0.040) (0.039) (0.038) (0.043)
Number of memberships 0.042⁎⁎⁎ 0.041⁎⁎⁎ 0.037⁎⁎⁎ 0.032⁎⁎⁎ 0.059⁎⁎⁎ 0.054⁎⁎⁎
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.011)
Age −0.075⁎⁎⁎ −0.075⁎⁎⁎ −0.081⁎⁎⁎ −0.080⁎⁎⁎ −0.089⁎⁎⁎ −0.087⁎⁎⁎
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Age2 0.001⁎⁎⁎ 0.001⁎⁎⁎ 0.001⁎⁎⁎ 0.001⁎⁎⁎ 0.001⁎⁎⁎ 0.001⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male −0.132⁎⁎⁎ −0.131⁎⁎⁎ −0.111⁎⁎⁎ −0.109⁎⁎⁎ −0.059⁎⁎ −0.062⁎⁎
(0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
Married or living together
(1 = yes)
0.494⁎⁎⁎ 0.505⁎⁎⁎ 0.448⁎⁎⁎ 0.451⁎⁎⁎ 0.392⁎⁎⁎ 0.384⁎⁎⁎
(0.041) (0.037) (0.044) (0.044) (0.053) (0.051)
Some college/college diploma
(1 = yes)
0.055 0.055 0.066⁎ 0.063⁎ 0.177⁎⁎⁎ 0.172⁎⁎⁎
(0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.035) (0.050) (0.047)
Number of children 0.011 0.008 0.033⁎⁎ 0.028⁎ 0.029 0.027
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.031) (0.030)
Full-time employee (1 = yes) 0.097⁎⁎⁎ 0.105⁎⁎⁎ 0.036 0.037 −0.023 −0.028
(0.028) (0.030) (0.035) (0.034) (0.051) (0.049)
Good health (1 = yes) 1.528⁎⁎⁎ 1.530⁎⁎⁎ 1.549⁎⁎⁎ 1.543⁎⁎⁎ 1.196⁎⁎⁎ 1.181⁎⁎⁎
(0.061) (0.061) (0.079) (0.078) (0.065) (0.065)
Relative income 0.149⁎⁎⁎ 0.142⁎⁎⁎ 0.160⁎⁎⁎ 0.159⁎⁎⁎ 0.274⁎⁎⁎ 0.281⁎⁎⁎
(0.021) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.027) (0.027)
Log GDP per capita (2011 PPP) 0.474 0.340 0.672⁎⁎⁎ 0.601⁎⁎⁎ 0.457⁎⁎ 0.390⁎⁎
(0.317) (0.283) (0.189) (0.171) (0.178) (0.170)
Unemployment rate 0.005 −0.005 −0.001 −0.005 −0.022 −0.028
(0.017) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.027) (0.028)
Inﬂation −0.001⁎⁎⁎ −0.001⁎⁎⁎ −0.005⁎⁎⁎ −0.005⁎⁎⁎ −0.000⁎⁎ −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 58,759 58,759 64,577 64,577 32,050 32,050
Adjusted R2 0.202 0.204 0.256 0.257 0.237 0.239
Notes: The dependent variable is life satisfaction, on a 1–10 scale. All regressions are estimated using OLS with robust standard errors, clustered at the country
level. All regressions include wave dummies and region dummies. The included regions are the Balkans, the Commonwealth of Independent States and the
Ukraine, non-European advanced countries (the US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Korea, Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong), South-Central Europe and Northern
Europe. See Tables A.1–A.2 for variable deﬁnitions and Table A.3 for the included countries.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
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Column 4 above. In other words, while institutions have a positive inﬂuence on life satisfaction in general, the magnitude of this
positive effect is reduced by half for non-EU transition economies.
Models (5) and (6) compare EU-10 and non-EU-10 countries. Based on Model (5), respondents in EU-10 countries are about
0.56 points less life-satisﬁed than those in non-EU transition countries. Upon ﬁrst consideration, one might conclude that there is
a life satisfaction penalty for being an EU member, yet the results are a little more nuanced. While the EU-10 country dummy is
statistically insigniﬁcant, the interaction term between the RoL and the EU-10 country dummy in Model (6) shows that there is
an additional life satisfaction beneﬁt of 0.66 points coming from the RoL for citizens living in EU transition countries.18 In short,
joining the EU has helped the EU-10 societies to reform their institutions, which has further improved the overall quality of the
social fabric and the functioning of a country, as captured in the life satisfaction outcomes.
7.3. Relative importance of institutional and macro-economic factors in transition economies
The analyses thus far demonstrate that the life satisfaction gap between transition and advanced countries can be closed by
improving macro-economic conditions and the RoL. Here, I further examine the relative importance of each life satisfaction de-
terminant to better understandwhat the predictors of life satisfaction in transition countries are and how policy-makers in post-
socialist societies can direct their efforts to increase the perceived quality of life of their citizens. Note that the analyses in this
section only use the sample of transition economies, employing variance decompositions using institutional data from the PRS
Group. The same analyses are available in the Appendix Fig. B.2 using the RoL variable from the World Bank.
Overall, relative income and socio-demographic characteristics appear to be the most relevant determinants of life satisfaction
in post-socialist countries, jointly explaining almost two-thirds of the variation in the dependent variable. The country's material
well-being and macro-economic volatility, as proxied by real GDP per capita and inﬂation, respectively, jointly explain about one-
quarter of the variation in life satisfaction in post-socialist societies. The RoL is much less relevant, i.e. it only explains 2% of this
variation, while the unemployment rate only accounts for 1%.
Based on these results, it appears that decision-makers in transition economies could improve perceivedwell-being through focusing
onmacro-economic reforms that increase material well-being and reduce volatility. At the same time, the results presented in Fig. 5 are
conditional on the RoL and informal institutions, suggesting that macro-economic reforms by themselves may be necessary yet insufﬁ-
cient to ensure objective and SWB. In the spirit of Milton Friedman's work, the RoL is necessary to facilitate the success of economic re-
forms. Social capital and trust are additional preconditions that enable social progress and economic and institutional reforms. Therefore,
whilemacro-economic reformsmay close the life satisfaction gapbetween advanced and transition countries, social trust and institution-
al arrangements are necessary to ensure well-being improvements in transition economies.
8. Discussion and conclusion
The transition process in CEE and the FSUwasmarked by the creation andmajor reforming of formal institutions on the one hand
and the deterioration of informal institutions and social capital on the other. Macro-economic studies have traditionally been con-
cerned with studying the instrumental role of institutions for GDP and growth. However, the economics of happiness has started in-
vestigating the link between micro- and macro-level and institutional determinants of SWB amidst the growing realization that
human well-being also has non-income dimensions. Given their informational value, SWB metrics can provide a guide to policy by
revealing information about the personal consequences of reforms and phenomena, which GDP may fail to reﬂect (Easterlin,
2014). Whether and how the RoL is linked to SWB is important not only intrinsically but also instrumentally, given that happiness
and life satisfaction are associated with positive outcomes such as health, longevity, productivity, innovation and others.
The large literature on happiness in transition has documented declining life satisfaction in transition and a “happiness gap”
between transition and non-transition countries. While the literature on the determinants of the gap is scarce, several studies
shed some light. For example, Guriev and Zhuravskaya (2009) discover that the gap disappears once they account for sample
bias, age and education, income, income volatility, inequality and public goods. In this paper, I use a more recent time series
and explore the extent to which the life satisfaction gap between transition and advanced countries is due to institutional fea-
tures. While I propose that institutions are a major factor behind the perceived well-being differentials between transition and
advanced countries, I do not imply that institutions can account for all of the unexplained variation in SWB; rather, I simply ex-
plore whether and to what extent the RoL can account for observed quality-of-life gaps between CEE/FSU and the West.
For this purpose, I merge individual-level data from the EVS/WVSwithmacro-economic and institutional variables. This paper'smain
results can be summarized as follows. First, there is an unconditional life satisfaction gapbetween transition andnon-transition countries,
which has been decreasing over time (Fig. 1). Controlling for a large set of socio-demographic characteristics, this gap persisted until the
early-2000s but has closed in the latestwave of theWVS survey (Table 1,Model (2)).Macro-economic covariateswere found to be a part
of the explanation for this reduction. In the 1990s and early-2000s, macro-economic differences between transition countries and the
West reduce themagnitudeof the gap and completely eliminate it byWave5of theWVS (Models (2) and (4) in Table 1). RoLwas a factor
reducing the size of the life satisfaction gap in the 1990s and it completely explained life satisfaction inWaves 4–5 of theWVS. In fact, it
appears that holding both macro-economic factors and the RoL constant, transition countries appear to be 0.6 points happier than18 This positive life satisfaction premium for the EU-10 members could be interpreted as a “credibility effect” of the improved institutions over time.
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Fig. 5. Relative importance of factors for life satisfaction, transition countries, (% contribution to R2). Notes: R2 = 0.236 the ﬁgure shows the Shapley-based decom-
position results, based on the PRS analysis sample, for the sub-sample of transition economies based on a regression of life satisfaction on the RoL, socio-demo-
graphic characteristics, macro-economic factors, social capital variables and wave dummies. The socio-demographics include: age, age squared, gender, marital
status, education, employment status and health perceptions.
Source: Author's calculations based on the PRS' ICRG data merged with the World Value Survey and the World Bank's macro data.
14 M. Nikolova / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxadvanced countries in the latestWVSwave. In otherwords, this paper's results suggest that people in post-socialist countriesmay be on a
path to transition completion, at least in people's minds.
The ﬁndings also show that macro-economic conditions are more important than the RoL for the life satisfaction of citizens in
transition economies. Nonetheless, economic progress is unlikely to be successful without the existence of solid formal and infor-
mal institutional fundaments. The EU has been an important catalyst of institutional change in the transition countries that joined
in the 2004, 2007 and 2013 enlargements, while the prospect of EU membership has also shaped the institutional transformations
in other transition economies. Importantly, however, while institutional change is a gradual and long-term process as transition
economies continue their transformation processes, they will also improve their quality-of-life perceptions.Funding sources
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Variables used in the main analyses.
Source: Author based onWorld Value Survey, 1981–2014 Longitudinal Data File. The Root Questionnaire forWave 5was used for questionwording. Note that question
wording may differ across the waves.
Variable Deﬁnition Values/Scale*
Dependent variables
Life satisfaction All things considered, how satisﬁed are you with your life as a whole these days?
Using this card on which 1 means you are “completely dissatisﬁed” and 10
means you are “completely satisﬁed”, where would you put your satisfaction
with your life as a whole?
1 = completely dissatisﬁed
10 = completely satisﬁed
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Age squared Respondent's age squared divided by 100
Male Respondent's gender 1 = male
0 = female
Marital statusa Respondent's marital status 1 = married or living together; 0 = otherwise
(divorced, separated, or widowed; single)
College Whether the respondent has some college education or a college diploma 1 = yes; 0 = no
Kidsa Number of own children Note: 8 or more was top-coded as 8
Employment statusa Respondent's employment status 1 = full-time; 0 = otherwise (including:
part-time, self-employed; retired; housewife;
student;
unemployed; other)
Healtha All in all, how would you describe your state of health these days? Would you
say it is…
0 = bad (very poor and poor)
1 = good (fair, good, very good)
Religiositya Religion. For each of the following, indicate how important it is in your life.
Would you say it is…
0 = not important (not at all important and not
very important)
1 = important (rather important and very
important)
Social trust Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you
need to be very careful in dealing with people?
1 = most people can be trusted
0 = need to be very careful
Membership Number of memberships: belong to social welfare service for elderly; belong to
religious organization; belong to education, arts, music or cultural activities;
member: belong to labor unions; belong to political parties; belong to local
political actions; belong to human rights; belong to conservation, the
environment, ecology, animal rights; belong to conservation, the environment,
ecology; belong to animal rights; belong to professional associations; belong to
youth work; belong to sports or recreation; belong to women's group; belong to
peace movement; belong to organization concerned with health; belong to
other groups; active/inactive membership of church or religious organization;
active/inactive membership of sport or recreation; active/inactive membership
of art, music, educational; active/inactive membership of labor unions;
active/inactive membership of political party; active/inactive membership of
environmental organization; active/inactive membership of professional
organization; active/inactive membership of charitable/humanitarian
organization; active/inactive membership of any other organization;
active/inactive membership: consumer organization
Min = 0; max = 16
Income scale On this card is an income scale on which 1 indicates the lowest income group
and 10 the highest income group in your country. We would like to know in
what group your household is. Please, specify the appropriate number, counting
all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in.
1 = lowest income group
10 = highest income group
a Recoded scale reported.
Table A.2
Macro-economic and institutional quality variables.
Source: Author based onWDI Documentation, ICRG Methodology Documents, and Kaufman et al. (2010).
Variable Deﬁnition Values/scalea
WDI variables
GDP per capita GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $) This variable is log-transformed
Inﬂation Inﬂation, consumer prices (annual %)
Unemployment Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate)
ICRG PRS rule of law variable
Law and order “Law” is assessed based on the strength and objectiveness of the legal system; “order” is
assessed based on popular observance of the law.
0 = high risk; 6 = low risk
WGI rule of law variable
Rule of lawa “capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have conﬁdence in and abide by
the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence”
Kaufmann et al. (2010), p. 4).
Rescaled to range from 0 to 6
(original scale: from−2.5 to +2.5)
a Recoded scale reported.
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Table A.3
Countries included in analyses.
Source: Author, based on estimation sample from Model (1), Table 1 for ICRG and Table B.1, Model (1) for WGI.
Wave Using ICRG data for institutions Using WGI data for institutions
Transition countries Advanced countries Transition countries Advanced countries




Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, the
Ukraine
Australia, Finland, Germany,
New Zealand, Norway, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, United
States






Finland, New Zealand, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland





Wave 5 (2005–2009) Bulgaria, Hungary, Moldova,
Poland, Romania, Russia,
Serbia, Slovenia, the Ukraine
Australia, Canada, Cyprus,
Finland, France, Germany, Hong









Finland, France, Germany, Hong




Wave 6 (2010–2013) Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Estonia, Kazakhstan, Poland,
Romania, Russia, Slovenia, the
Ukraine
Australia, Cyprus, Germany,
Japan, South Korea, Netherlands,









Japan, South Korea, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Singapore, Spain,
Sweden, United States
16 M. Nikolova / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxAppendix B. Robustness checks using RoL data from the worldwide governance indictors
As a robustness check, I also merged the WVS-WDI data with comparable RoL information from the Worldwide Gover-
nance Database following the same procedure as in the main analysis. See Table A.3 for the countries included in the analysis.
The data source does not seem to make a tremendous difference and the results are robust to using the RoL measure from the
WGI.
Fig. B.1 shows that the WGI's measure of the RoL tends to vary much less compared with the PRS's measure shown in Fig. 2.
Transition countries also score lower on the WGI's rule of law index compared with the one provided by PRS.Fig. B.1. Rule of law, unconditional mean, 1994–2013.
Source: Author's calculations based on the World Bank's WGI Data merged with the World Value Survey and the World Bank's macro data.
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17M. Nikolova / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2016) xxx–xxxTables B.1 and B.2 show the same analyses as in Tables 1–2 in the main analysis. In Table B.1 Models (1) and (2) include
only socio-economic and demographic controls, while Models (3) and (4) introduce the macro-level controls. The results
in Table B.1 are very similar to those in Table 1. Model (1) in Table B.1 shows that the conditional life satisfaction differential
between transition and advanced countries is about 0.7 on a scale of 1–10 (compared with 0.9 in the main analysis). As in the
main analysis (Table 1), Model (2) in Table B.1 shows that the life satisfaction gap declined across the waves, from about 1.9
points in Wave 3 to about 0.7 points in Wave 5 and is not statistically signiﬁcant in the last wave. As in the main analysis, the
life satisfaction gap disappears when I add the macro-economic variables in Model (3). After controlling for macro-economic
conditions, the life satisfaction gap between advanced and transition economies only appears inWave 3 (1994–1998), before
subsequently disappearing in later waves. In the main analysis, there is a marginally signiﬁcant life satisfaction gap in Wave
4, even after controlling for macro-economic conditions.
In Table B.2, I present the same set of regression results as those in Table 2. As in the main analysis, the results in Table B.2
show that the transition country dummy becomes statistically insigniﬁcant once I add the RoL control. While the main conclu-
sions and results still hold, there are several notable differences between Tables 2 and B.2. First, referring to Column (3), whereasTable B.1
Life satisfaction regressions, socio-economic and macro-economic determinants, 1994–2013.
Source: Author's calculations based on the World Bank's WGI Data merged with the World Value Survey and the World Bank's macro data.
Dep. var. = life satisfaction (1–10) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Transition country (1 = yes) −0.738⁎⁎ −0.368
(0.279) (0.276)
Transition ∗ Wave 3 −1.901⁎⁎⁎ −1.580⁎⁎⁎
(0.253) (0.344)
Transition ∗ Wave 4 −1.138⁎ −0.642
(0.625) (0.522)
Transition ∗ Wave 5 −0.729⁎⁎⁎ −0.424
(0.263) (0.264)
Transition ∗ Wave 6 0.022 0.141
(0.279) (0.250)
Religion important (1 = yes) 0.183⁎⁎⁎ 0.176⁎⁎⁎ 0.200⁎⁎⁎ 0.193⁎⁎⁎
(0.052) (0.042) (0.055) (0.046)
Social trust (1 = yes) 0.386⁎⁎⁎ 0.373⁎⁎⁎ 0.365⁎⁎⁎ 0.360⁎⁎⁎
(0.048) (0.041) (0.045) (0.038)
Number of memberships 0.065⁎⁎⁎ 0.061⁎⁎⁎ 0.069⁎⁎⁎ 0.064⁎⁎⁎
(0.014) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010)
Age −0.085⁎⁎⁎ −0.084⁎⁎⁎ −0.085⁎⁎⁎ −0.084⁎⁎⁎
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Age2 0.001⁎⁎⁎ 0.001⁎⁎⁎ 0.001⁎⁎⁎ 0.001⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male −0.100⁎⁎⁎ −0.095⁎⁎⁎ −0.092⁎⁎⁎ −0.093⁎⁎⁎
(0.026) (0.023) (0.025) (0.023)
Married or living together (1 = yes) 0.366⁎⁎⁎ 0.384⁎⁎⁎ 0.380⁎⁎⁎ 0.386⁎⁎⁎
(0.039) (0.034) (0.036) (0.034)
Some college/college diploma (1 = yes) 0.026 0.040 0.076⁎ 0.078⁎⁎
(0.050) (0.043) (0.038) (0.036)
Number of children 0.062⁎⁎ 0.051⁎⁎ 0.050⁎⁎ 0.043⁎⁎
(0.024) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018)
Full-time employee (1 = yes) 0.010 0.012 0.011 0.021
(0.052) (0.046) (0.039) (0.036)
Good health (1 = yes) 1.525⁎⁎⁎ 1.484⁎⁎⁎ 1.469⁎⁎⁎ 1.455⁎⁎⁎
(0.076) (0.071) (0.073) (0.069)
Relative income 0.207⁎⁎⁎ 0.198⁎⁎⁎ 0.191⁎⁎⁎ 0.187⁎⁎⁎
(0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
Log GDP per capita (2011 PPP) 0.485⁎ 0.246
(0.262) (0.188)




Region and wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 81,039 81,039 76,805 76,805
Adjusted R2 0.260 0.280 0.277 0.288
Notes: The dependent variable in all regressions is life satisfaction, measured on a scale of 1 to 10. All regressions are estimated using OLS with robust standard
errors, clustered at the country level. All regressions include wave dummies and region dummies. The included regions are: Balkans, Commonwealth of Indepen-
dent States and the Ukraine, non-European advanced countries (US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Korea, Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong), South-Central Europe,
Northern Europe. See Tables A.1–A.2 for variable deﬁnitions and Table A.3 for the included countries.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
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Table B.2
Life satisfaction regressions, with rule of law controls from the World Bank, 1994–2013.
Source: Author's calculations based on the World Bank's WGI Data merged with the World Value Survey and the World Bank's macro data.
Dep. var. = life satisfaction (1–10) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Transition country (1 = yes) −0.519 −0.268 0.335
(0.339) (0.324) (0.303)
Transition ∗ Wave 3 −1.497⁎⁎⁎
(0.407)
Transition ∗ Wave 4 −0.564
(0.511)
Transition ∗ Wave 5 −0.364
(0.297)
Transition ∗ Wave 6 0.211
(0.303)
Rule of law (0–5) 0.141 0.078 0.053 0.428⁎⁎⁎
(0.147) (0.118) (0.097) (0.133)
(Rule of law -mean) ∗ Transition −0.598⁎⁎
(0.232)
Religion important (1 = yes) 0.186⁎⁎⁎ 0.199⁎⁎⁎ 0.193⁎⁎⁎ 0.214⁎⁎⁎
(0.053) (0.055) (0.046) (0.058)
Social trust (1 = yes) 0.375⁎⁎⁎ 0.361⁎⁎⁎ 0.358⁎⁎⁎ 0.334⁎⁎⁎
(0.045) (0.044) (0.037) (0.041)
Number of memberships 0.061⁎⁎⁎ 0.068⁎⁎⁎ 0.063⁎⁎⁎ 0.054⁎⁎⁎
(0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011)
Age −0.084⁎⁎⁎ −0.084⁎⁎⁎ −0.084⁎⁎⁎ −0.084⁎⁎⁎
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Age2 0.001⁎⁎⁎ 0.001⁎⁎⁎ 0.001⁎⁎⁎ 0.001⁎⁎⁎
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male −0.095⁎⁎⁎ −0.091⁎⁎⁎ −0.092⁎⁎⁎ −0.088⁎⁎⁎
(0.027) (0.025) (0.023) (0.025)
Married or living together (1 = yes) 0.364⁎⁎⁎ 0.378⁎⁎⁎ 0.385⁎⁎⁎ 0.394⁎⁎⁎
(0.040) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036)
Some college/college diploma (1 = yes) 0.027 0.077⁎⁎ 0.079⁎⁎ 0.092⁎⁎
(0.050) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036)
Number of children 0.065⁎⁎ 0.050⁎⁎ 0.043⁎⁎ 0.042⁎⁎
(0.024) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018)
Full-time employee (1 = yes) 0.001 0.008 0.019 0.012
(0.047) (0.037) (0.034) (0.035)
Good health (1 = yes) 1.532⁎⁎⁎ 1.474⁎⁎⁎ 1.457⁎⁎⁎ 1.455⁎⁎⁎
(0.075) (0.073) (0.069) (0.068)
Relative income 0.209⁎⁎⁎ 0.192⁎⁎⁎ 0.188⁎⁎⁎ 0.184⁎⁎⁎
(0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
Log GDP per capita (2011 PPP) 0.462⁎ 0.233 0.374
(0.259) (0.190) (0.229)
Unemployment rate −0.011 −0.017 −0.017
(0.018) (0.014) (0.015)
Inﬂation −0.009⁎ −0.000 −0.010⁎⁎
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Region and wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 80,850 76,805 76,805 76,805
Adjusted R2 0.262 0.278 0.288 0.282
Notes: The dependent variable is life satisfaction, measured on a scale of 1 to 10. All regressions are estimated using OLS with robust standard errors, clustered at
the country level. All regressions include wave dummies and region dummies. The included regions are: Balkans, Commonwealth of Independent States and the
Ukraine, non-European advanced countries (US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Korea, Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong), South-Central Europe, Northern Europe. See
Tables A.1–A.2 for variable deﬁnitions and Table A.3 for the included countries.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
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show a positive coefﬁcient, although it is not statistically signiﬁcant.19
Second, note that the RoL variable is positive but statistically insigniﬁcant in Models (1) to (3). In fact, this variable does not
vary much: its mean is 1.9 with a standard deviation of 1.2 for transition economies and 5.3 with a standard deviation of 0.6 in
the advanced economies sample. The results suggest that as it does not strongly vary, especially in the advanced countries sample,
the RoL variable in the WGI may not be a robust predictor of life satisfaction.
Finally, note that based on Model (4), there appears to be a large and statistically signiﬁcant negative life satisfaction premium
for transition economies related to the RoL, which is also evident in Column (4) of Table 2. It appears that while the results are19 The life satisfaction differences between post-socialist and advanced countries in Wave 3 is about 1.5 points in Table B.1, whereas it is only 0.4 points in Table 2.
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economic and institutional conditions may indeed raise the perceived quality of life in transition economies.Fig. B.2. Relative importance of factors for life satisfaction, transition countries (% contribution to R2).
Notes: R2= 0.250. Theﬁgure shows the Shapley-baseddecomposition results, based on theWGI analysis sample, for the sub-sample of transition economies based on a
regression of life satisfaction on the RoL, socio-demographic characteristics, macro-economic factors, social capital variables and wave dummies. The socio-
demographics include: age, age squared, gender, marital status, education, employment status and health perceptions.
Source: Author's calculations based on the World Bank's WGI Data merged with the World Value Survey and the World Bank's macro data.References
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